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Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: 







In economic terms, the environment is largely a public good. Contributing to a public 
good is costly to an individual, while the benefits are enjoyed by all.  Despite this, 
many people voluntarily contribute to public goods, both in laboratory economic 
experiments and through day-to-day environmental decisions.  These voluntary 
contributions are largely motivated intrinsically, that is satisfaction comes from the act 
itself rather than external rewards.  Policy interventions are often required to increase 
the provision of public goods to the socially optimal level, which usually take the form 
of extrinsic incentives such as payments or regulations.  Theoretical and empirical 
evidence from psychology and economics suggests that such extrinsic incentives can 
crowd out the intrinsic motivations which underlie voluntary contributions.  As a 
result, a policy may have less than the anticipated impact.  It is even possible for a 
costly policy intervention to lead to a decrease in overall public good provision, as 
individuals cease to contribute voluntarily.  This paper argues that environmental 
policy design should proceed with caution in the presence of intrinsic motivations.  
Weak regulations and small, competitive financial incentives have the greatest 
potential for negative effects.  Recognising and supporting existing efforts can crowd 
in, rather than crowd out, voluntary contributions.  With careful design and 
implementation, there is the potential to maintain and support intrinsic motivations 
while also providing robust extrinsic incentives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Institutions are the norms, rules and organisations that shape the way in which 
people interact.  They provide the incentives to which people respond when making 
decisions.  However, institutions are not simply passive transmitters of incentives.  
They can affect people’s motivations and change the way in which they make their 
decisions.  This means that the effects of institutions on human behaviour can be 
complex.  Behaviour can be motivated by extrinsic factors such as rewards or 
sanctions, as well as intrinsic factors which include personal values and social 
concerns.  Formal institutions typically focus on extrinsic motivations, providing 
financial or regulatory incentives to achieve desired outcomes.  However these 
formal institutions can also impact on intrinsic motivations.  In some cases, formal 
institutions can ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivations for an activity.  
From a policy perspective, there is a danger that introducing a formal 
institution may actually lead to an overall decrease in motivation and outcomes if 
intrinsically motivated behaviour is crowded out.  For instance, it is possible that 
introducing incentive payments encouraging people to contribute to a public good 
may actually lead to a decrease in the amount of public good supplied, even though 
additional public funds are being invested.  This may be particularly likely for policies 
targeting environmental works, which many people are intrinsically motivated to carry 
out voluntarily to some degree.  Institutions have different impacts on different forms 
of motivation; therefore the effect of an institution will depend on the mix of 
motivations relevant to a particular situation.  Institutions can also change the way in 
which people perceive a situation, and therefore which behavioural norms they apply. Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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These interactions present both an opportunity and a threat for policy design.  
Poorly considered policy interventions may cause ‘collateral damage’ to existing 
motivations or norms, resulting in perverse outcomes which can have considerable 
social and economic costs, and be difficult to reverse.  At the same time, there is an 
opportunity for good institutions to strengthen and support existing motivations while 
also providing additional incentives, delivering good outcomes at minimum public 
cost.  Policy design should therefore benefit from an improved understanding of the 
way in which institutions affect how human decisions are motivated and framed.  This 
paper begins by considering some of the factors that motivate contributions to public 
goods.  It then reviews theoretical and empirical evidence of how these motivations 
are impacted by formal institutions, and discusses implications for environmental 
policy. 
MOTIVATIONS AND PUBLIC GOODS 
Many environmental goods and services have public good characteristics, in that 
their benefits are enjoyed collectively.  The trouble with public goods is that it is not 
possible to compel people to pay for the services they enjoy.  Individuals therefore 
have little incentive to provide them, so public goods are typically undersupplied in 
markets.  Much economic theory is based around the rational actor paradigm, which 
assumes that individuals act in the way that maximises their own self-interest.  Such 
a ‘rational’ individual would not contribute to the supply of a public good beyond his 
or her marginal personal benefit.  However, many people voluntarily contribute far in 
excess of this.  For instance, many people invest time and money in improving the 
environment and supporting charities.  This behaviour also occurs in the laboratory, 
in public good experiments (reviewed by Ledyard, 1995).  In these experiments, 
individuals must choose between keeping money for themselves or contributing to a A. Reeson 
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shared fund.  Contributions to the fund are doubled and then divided equally among 
all participants (typically four people).  This creates a public good dilemma, in that the 
best outcome occurs if each participant contributes the full amount; however, each 
has an incentive to contribute nothing and free ride off the contributions of others.  
While some experimental subjects do choose to free ride, many make voluntary 
contributions to a public good, even though it is personally costly to do so. 
Without attempting a review of the psychology literature, it is worth considering 
what motivates people to contribute to public goods.  Motivations can be broadly 
characterised as intrinsic or extrinsic.  Intrinsic motivation is inherent to an individual, 
and may relate to a sense of enjoyment, satisfaction, accomplishment, responsibility 
or obligation.  By contrast, extrinsic motivation is directed by external rewards or 
incentives such as payments and sanctions.  There is evidence from the economics 
and social science literature that both are important with regard to environmental 
public goods. 
Intrinsic Motivations 
Altruism, seeking to improve the welfare of others without receiving any personal 
benefit, may underlie pro-environmental behaviour, or costly voluntary contributions 
to laboratory public goods.  Another motivation is ‘impure altruism’ – people may get 
a ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1989) and improved self image from carrying out 
environmental works.  Experimental evidence indicates that both pure and warm 
glow altruism can motivate charitable donations (Harbaugh et al., 2007).  A related 
motivation is concern for fairness.  Numerous studies show that experimental 
participants value outcomes they perceive as fair, even if it involves them receiving 
less money than they otherwise might (eg. Berg et al., 1995; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; 
Falk et al. 2003).  Negative responses to inequitable rewards have even been Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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observed in monkeys, suggesting that fairness concerns have a deep-seated 
evolutionary basis (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003).  Self-image again appears 
important, suggesting there are both ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ fairness motivations.  People 
act less fairly if they can choose to remain ignorant of the impact on others of their 
choices (Dana et al., 2003). 
An underlying motivation for fairness may support mutual cooperation, even in 
anonymous, one-off laboratory scenarios.  Experiments show that people will 
reciprocate positive actions by others, even at a cost to themselves (Gintis, 2000).  
They are also willing to punish actions that they perceive as unfair, even if such 
punishment is costly (Guth et al., 1982; Fehr and Gächter, 2000).  Such behaviour is 
observed across diverse societies and cultures (Henrich et al., 2006).  There is 
evidence that these motivations have a neurological basis.  Brain scans indicate that 
both pure altruism and warm glow altruism stimulate reward processing regions of 
the brain (Harbaugh et al., 2007). Mutual cooperation with another person in a 
prisoners’ dilemma is also associated with activation of reward processing areas, 
even more so that the more profitable outcome of defecting while the other player 
cooperates (Rilling et al., 2002).  Punishing defectors in economic experiments also 
stimulates reward-related areas (de Quervain et al., 2004).  
Economic experiments therefore demonstrate that altruism, self image and 
fairness can overcome financial motivations, even in anonymous, de-contextualised 
laboratory settings.  The importance of such ‘moral sentiments’ was recognised by 
Adam Smith (Smith, 1759).  There is therefore every reason to consider that these 
motivations will be important in environmental decision making.  Many people 
consider the environment has inherent value, and so will behave altruistically towards 
it.  Contributing to the environment is also likely to enhance self image, promoting A. Reeson 
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warm glow altruism.  It may be considered ‘fair’ to contribute to the environment, 
perhaps because others are also doing so, and people may have a sense of 
responsibility or obligation.  A study of environmental volunteering in Australia 
identified six broad classes of motivations (Measham and Barnett, 2007).  These 
included contributing to an environmental cause, a general desire to care for the 
environment, and a desire to care for a particular place.  Respondents also 
expressed a desire to contribute to the community, and compensate for a sense of 
guilt, presumably relating to perceptions of their role in environmental degradation.  
These may be considered as intrinsic motivations, analogous to altruism, warm glow, 
fairness and responsibility concerns.  
Another key motivation among environmental volunteers is social interactions, 
and working with others towards a shared goal (De Young, 1996; Measham and 
Barnett, 2007).  As well as meeting new people with similar interests, volunteers can 
also be seen to be contributing to a good cause.  Laboratory experiments show that a 
desire for social approval can motivate contributions to a public good.  In a public 
goods dilemma, some people raise their contributions simply in response to others 
anonymously expressing ‘disapproval’ of their actions (Masclet et al., 2003).  Gächter 
and Fehr (1999) found that social approval had little effect in increasing contributions 
among strangers, but if even weak social ties or group identity were formed approval 
incentives significantly reduced free riding.  It is notable that communication among 
participants is highly effective at raising contributions to the optimum level in 
laboratory experiments, even though any promises made are non-binding (Ledyard, 
1995). Face-to-face communication proves more effective than more impersonal 
electronic communication (Ostrom, 2000).  Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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Improving skills and learning about the environment were recognised as 
motivating factors by environmental volunteers (Measham and Barnett, 2007).  A 
feeling of competence at an activity is considered a key part of intrinsic motivation 
(Deci and Ryan, 1985; De Young, 1996).  Developing and expressing skills and 
knowledge relating to the environment may therefore motivate voluntary actions.   
This is analogous to a hobby, which is a classic intrinsically motivated behaviour.  
Hobbies can provide a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment – success can be 
achieved through effort, knowledge and skill.  Environmental volunteers get 
satisfaction from seeing the outcomes of their work, such as revegetation or removal 
of weeds and rubbish from a particular area (Measham and Barnett, 2007).  A key 
aspect of intrinsically motivated behaviour is that the individual has a sense of control 
– they are doing it for their own reasons (Deci and Ryan, 1985).  
Extrinsic Motivations 
Contributing to a public good might encourage others to do the same, with benefits 
all round.  When faced with unfamiliar situations, people commonly look to imitate the 
actions of others.  This means that norms of behaviour are pre-disposed to emerge, 
and individuals may be able to benefit from encouraging such norms to be 
cooperative rather than non-cooperative.  Laboratory public good games indicate that 
many people are ‘conditional cooperators’ (Ostrom, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001).  
They are willing to cooperate initially rather than free ride, but if others do not 
reciprocate they will revert to free riding themselves.  In the presence of conditional 
cooperators, there may be material benefits to contributing as it will promote 
reciprocal contributions from others.  In public good experiments 50-60% of 
participants can be classified as conditional cooperators (Kurzban and Houser, 2005; A. Reeson 
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Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006).  Promoting reciprocal contributions may therefore 
be a significant motivation.  
In an environmental context, contributing to the environment may encourage 
others to do the same.  Environmental volunteering often involves activism or 
education activities (Measham and Barnett, 2007), which are clearly intended to 
encourage (or coerce) others to contribute to an environmental cause.  However, 
given the conditional cooperator nature of many people, making any visible 
contribution may encourage others to do the same.  Similarly, being seen not to 
contribute may promote negative reciprocity, with others ceasing to cooperate.  In the 
laboratory, even a small proportion of free riders may eventually cause a whole group 
to cease cooperating.  Finally, more formal incentives such as material rewards or 
sanctions can be applied to motivate contributions to public good.  In Australia, 
stewardship payments are widely used to promote environmental activity, through 
subsidies, grants and market-based instruments.  There are also numerous 
regulatory schemes intended to maintain or promote environmental public goods, 
such as land clearing laws and pollution regulations.  Such regulations make it 
financially costly not to contribute. 
WHEN MOTIVATONS COLLIDE - CROWDING OUT IN THEORY  
The evidence related in the previous section indicates that intrinsic motivations are 
important factors motivating contributions to public goods, both in laboratory 
experiments and real world environmental behaviour.  These intrinsic motivations 
result in people contributing more than would be expected considering only their 
financial self interest.  However, where these voluntary contributions remain below 
the optimal level there is a role for policy to promote increased contributions.  This 
often involves introducing additional extrinsic incentives, with the aim of increasing Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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the overall supply of the public good.  In terms of economic theory, providing an 
additional incentive can only increase the supply of the desired activity.  
However, motivations are not additive.  Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have 
quite different, and potentially contradictory, foundations.  Intrinsic motivation is 
based on a sense of autonomy and control, which may be crowded out by extrinsic 
incentives (Deci, 1971).  Evidence from psychological studies shows that extrinsic 
rewards tend to reduce intrinsic motivation for experimental tasks (Deci et al., 1999).  
Regulations or monetary rewards can be seen as controlling, reducing autonomy, 
and making an activity seem less satisfying (Lepper and Greene, 1978).  In a public 
goods context, the possibility of extrinsic rewards may negate any ‘good deed’ aspect 
of an activity, so reducing self image and social approval benefits (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2006).  Crowding out is likely to be particularly severe with financial rewards 
as money is a common means of controlling people’s behaviour.  
Crowding out may therefore interfere with the price effect (Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).  For activities where people are intrinsically motivated, the 
supply curve may be kinked (Figure 1) (Frey, 2001).  In the absence of extrinsic 
incentives, people are willing to supply quantity x.  Introducing a small payment 
crowds out intrinsic motivations, but as the extrinsic incentive (ie. the price) 
increases, people will supply more.  Point y represents the turning point, where 
intrinsic motivations have been crowded out and the price effect begins to dominate; 
however paying any amount below z will result in an overall reduction in supply (Frey, 
2001).  Even above z, the increase in supply will initially be very small, compared to 
the amount of money paid out.  Unlike conventional supply curves, this effect may be 
unidirectional – reducing the price will not necessarily result in a recovery of intrinsic 
motivation.  Therefore if an extrinsic incentive negatively impacts on existing intrinsic A. Reeson 
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motivations, its net effect will be less than anticipated, and may even be negative.  In 
other words, spending additional public money may actually decrease the supply of a 
public good. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
However, formal institutions need not necessarily crowd out intrinsic 
motivations, and in some circumstances they may have the opposite effect.   
Institutions may strengthen intrinsic motivations if they recognise and acknowledge 
effort, boosting self esteem and satisfaction, without being perceived as controlling 
(Frey, 1997).  A meta-analysis of psychological studies showed that ‘verbal rewards’ 
and feedback increased intrinsic motivation, while material rewards decreased it 
(Deci et al., 1999).  The effect of an institution on intrinsic motivations is likely to 
depend on how it is perceived, which means the impacts of policy interventions may 
not always be straightforward to predict.  
WHEN MOTIVATIONS COLLIDE - CROWDING OUT IN PRACTICE  
Financial Incentives 
A number of economic studies have demonstrated the potential for crowding out in 
response to financial incentives.  In a field experiment Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) 
showed that introducing a small incentive payment for collecting charity donations 
actually reduced the collection rate compared to no financial incentive.  Intrinsic 
motivation for collecting donations is likely to be high, but appeared to be crowded 
out by the small financial incentive.  Offering a larger cash incentive raised 
performance close to the levels with no cash incentives.  Similarly performance in a 
quiz was lower with a small cash incentive than with no incentive, but significantly 
higher with larger cash incentives.  Quiz performance is likely to involve less intrinsic Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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motivation than collecting charity donations, so the effects of motivational crowding 
should be less severe.  The authors conclude that if incentives are to be paid, they 
must be sufficiently large, otherwise they are worse than useless.  
Frey and Goette (1999) carried out an econometric analysis of volunteer work 
in Switzerland which shows evidence of crowding.  Individuals who are paid for 
volunteer work tend to contribute fewer hours than those who receive no financial 
reward.  But among those who are paid, higher rewards are correlated with more 
effort.  Increased job opportunities in the broader economy reduce volunteer work, 
while higher tax rates increase volunteering.  This suggests that financial 
considerations are important overall, but this cannot be extrapolated to conclude that 
paying for volunteer work will increase effort.  Small financial incentives may actually 
decrease hours worked, although at some point a larger incentive should lead to an 
increase.  This would result in the kinked supply curve illustrated in Figure 1. 
An experimental survey (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee,1997) found that around 
50% of people were prepared to accept a radioactive waste facility near their town; 
this was considered a public good as there were negative perceptions of the facility, 
but an acceptance that it had to go somewhere.  However, the level of acceptance 
dropped to 25% if people were told that they would be compensated for having the 
site in their locality.  Introducing a price seems to change the way in which people (or 
at least 25% of them) view the decision, again resulting in the crowding out of 
intrinsically motivated social preferences.  
An experimental study by Reeson and Tisdell (2007) found that financial 
incentives offered through a competitive market mechanism had a marked impact on 
the way in which people behaved in a public goods situation.  Incentives were offered 
through a competitive tender in which participants could offer to contribute to the A. Reeson 
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public good in return for a payment.  Those offers that contributed the most to the 
public good in return for the least payment were accepted, while others were 
rejected.  Participants then had to decide how much to contribute to the public good 
(with those whose offers had been accepted required to contribute at least the 
amount they had offered).  Prior to the introduction of this market institution, many 
participants were making costly voluntary contributions to the public good.  However, 
with the market incentives in place, the vast majority of participants sought to 
maximise their financial self interest.  The financial incentives were not used to 
subsidise existing or increased contributions, but rather to seek to profit from 
contributing.  Those whose offers were unsuccessful subsequently contributed 
nothing to the public good, even if they had been making costly voluntary 
contributions in the initial stages of the experiment, prior to the (unexpected) 
introduction of the market.  The authors suggest that the market institution changes 
the way in which people perceive the situation, triggering a ‘market instinct’ in which 
they express self-interested rather than social preferences. 
Regulations and Sanctions 
The effects of crowding out intrinsic motivations through regulations can be readily 
demonstrated in laboratory economic experiments.  Frey (1997) reports on a dictator 
game, in which participants were given 7 francs and had to decide how much, if any, 
to give to another person (who begins with nothing).  The first group passed on an 
average of 3fr, which is typical for this kind of game.  A second group were told they 
must pass on a minimum of 2.50fr; again this group gave an average of 3fr.   
However when the rule was subsequently withdrawn, their contributions dropped to 
1.80fr.  Meanwhile in the group which never had the rule contributions remained 
around 3fr.  Reeson and Tisdell (in press) found evidence that experience of being Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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regulated can crowd out voluntary contributions in a public good dilemma.  Among 
their experimental participants, experience of being regulated resulted in significantly 
lower contributions following the removal of the regulation, compared to a control 
group who had not been regulated.  These experimental results suggest that 
enforcing pro-social behaviour can undermine intrinsic motivations and once such 
regulations are in place, they may be problematic to remove without a significant 
decline in voluntary contributions. 
The potential pitfalls of well-intended sanctions were demonstrated in a field 
experiment by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b).  As a ‘policy’ to reduce the number of 
parents arriving late, a group of day care centres introduced a fine for those who 
were late collecting their children.  Theoretically the fine should only add an extra 
incentive to arrive on time.  However, it resulted in the incidence of late arrivals 
doubling.  The fine (which was small – cUS$3) appears to have crowded out intrinsic 
motivations to avoid being late.  Prior to the policy, parents are likely to have felt 
obliged to avoid inconveniencing centre staff.  Introducing the fine changed these 
perceptions, and the small fine in itself provided a relatively weak incentive to arrive 
on time.  This study also demonstrates that once crowding out has occurred it may 
be difficult to reverse – once the fine was removed, the rate of late arrivals remained 
at the higher level.  
A number of experimental studies have shown that the threat of sanctions can 
crowd out trust.  In trust experiments, a proposer has an opportunity to transfer 
money to a responder.  The amount transferred is typically multiplied by three, after 
which the responder can make a return transfer (Berg et al., 1995).  Therefore if the 
proposer sends the maximum amount, and the responder returns around half of it, 
both players will profit.  However, trust is required, as the responder may simply A. Reeson 
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choose to keep all the money.  Experimental data indicate that trusting and 
trustworthy behaviour is common, though by no means universal (Berg et al., 1995).  
If the experiment is modified so that proposers can sanction responders who do not 
reciprocate (by imposing a small fine), responders actually prove less trustworthy 
than in the absence of a sanction (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003).  However, if a 
sanction is available but the proposer chooses to take it off the table at the outset, 
responders are more trustworthy, returning more than in the absence of any sanction 
(Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003).  
In an anonymous, once-off interaction, responders in trust experiments have 
no financial incentive to make a return transfer to their partner, yet many do.  With 
the sanction there is a financial incentive, but return transfers are less.  It appears 
that the sanction crowds out reciprocity, but is insufficient (it is less than the potential 
financial benefits of being untrustworthy) as an extrinsic incentive to motivate return 
transfers.  By contrast, when proposers choose not to have access to the sanction, 
there is positive reciprocity from responders, and return transfers are greater.  To 
some extent, trust begets trustworthiness (Fehr and List, 2004), and leads to better 
outcomes than a relatively weak sanction.  In this scenario, intrinsically motivated 
reciprocity is more effective at promoting trust-based cooperation than an extrinsic 
sanction. 
In a more complex version of a trust experiment (the ‘gift exchange game’), 
Fehr and Gächter (2002b) found that people threatened with a fine (labelled as a 
deduction) for not cooperating made significantly less generous responses than 
those offered a bonus, even though the two incentives were effectively identical.  A 
third group with no incentive system responded significantly more generously than 
either group faced with an incentive.  Both formal incentives crowded out voluntary Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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cooperation, but the effect was greater when the incentive was framed in a negative 
way.  This suggests that people respond not only to the sanction itself, but also to the 
perceived motive behind it.  Crowding out is particularly severe with negative 
sanctions, which suggest distrust and can trigger negative reciprocity. 
In other experimental scenarios sanctions are effective at enhancing 
cooperation.  In public goods experiments, allowing participants to impose small fines 
on group members who have not cooperated results in significantly greater levels of 
contributions (Fehr and Gächter, 2002a).  This difference may relate to perceptions 
of the motives for punishment in these different scenarios.  In public good games, 
sanctioning can be considered as altruistic as it is done for the benefit of the group, 
while in the trust game sanctions promote only the self-interest of the proposer (Fehr 
and Rockenbach, 2003).  The effect of sanctions also relates to how people frame 
decisions.  In an experimental study, introducing a sanctioning system to a public 
good-type dilemma resulted in an increase in the proportion of people viewing their 
decision as a ‘business’ rather than an ‘ethical’ issue, leading to an overall decrease 
in cooperation (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999).  Those who considered the decision 
as an ‘ethical’ issue were inclined to act cooperatively, regardless of the strength of 
any sanctions, while those who considered it a ‘business’ issue responded positively 
to sanctions (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999).  
These studies show that, where there are existing intrinsic motivations, 
regulations and sanctions can in some cases have a detrimental effect on human 
cooperation.  While strong sanctions work better than weak sanctions, better 
outcomes may be achieved by instead promoting trust and reciprocity, particularly 
with one-on-one relationships.  However, public good experiments, and evidence A. Reeson 
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from collectively managed natural resources (Ostrom, 2000), indicate that there is a 
role for the strategic use of sanctions to reduce free riding within groups. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Crowding Out and Environmental Policy 
A range of theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that formal institutions, such 
as regulations or incentive payments, can crowd out intrinsic motivations for an 
activity.  This has serious policy implications, as introducing formal institutions may 
have unintended consequences.  Environmental policy may be particularly prone to 
crowding out since intrinsic motivations are often high.  In a worst case scenario, a 
costly policy intervention that provides incentive payments or imposes a regulatory 
system may actually result in a net decrease in environmental activity, as existing 
intrinsically motivated activity is crowded out.  Empirical evidence from both 
laboratory and field studies suggest that such a scenario is far from improbable, and 
that once crowding out has occurred it may not be readily reversed.  Therefore a 
poorly considered intervention may have an adverse impact lasting far longer than 
the policy itself. 
Two of the major environmental policy challenges faced by various levels of 
government in Australia are water availability and greenhouse gas emissions.   
Individuals and companies are currently taking many voluntary actions to mitigate 
these problems.  However, to fully address these issues there is likely to be a need 
for additional incentives or regulations.  The danger is that introducing these formal 
institutions will crowd out existing intrinsically motivated voluntary activity.  If a 
‘drought fee’ is added to water bills, will people still be as willing to reduce water use 
by hauling buckets of used shower water around their gardens?  Will demand for low 
emission vehicles fall if a carbon tax is added to the price of petrol?  Motivational Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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crowding suggests that, in some cases at least, such policies may negatively impact 
on voluntary actions.  Crowding out may also be an issue for policies intended to 
promote the provision of ecosystem services by landholders and other community 
members. 
Theory and experiment suggest that the worst form of institution may be weak 
sanctions or relatively small financial incentives.  Such institutions are sufficient to 
crowd out intrinsic motivation, but insufficient to motivate people to cooperate, or to 
trust that others will cooperate.  Unfortunately, many environmental policies are likely 
to fit this description.  Crowding out can also spread to other areas, beyond where 
extrinsic interventions are applied, known as the motivational spill-over effect.  For 
instance imposing effluent charges may lead people to protect the environment less 
in other areas where there are no external incentives (Frey, 1997).  Neurologically 
and psychologically people seem limited in their ability to distinguish between varying 
circumstances, and so may apply a new set of norms to other, sometimes 
inappropriate, areas (Frey, 2001). 
Crowding In and Environmental Policy 
The psychological theory that provides a basis for understanding crowding out also 
suggests ways in which the problem may be mitigated.  Intrinsic motivations can be 
strengthened by institutions that provide acknowledgement and support rather than 
control, and promote self determination.  Perceptions of fairness, trust and personal 
relationships are also important.  Environmental incentive schemes tend to be more 
effective if they are delivered by a local agency with strong community links, as there 
is a better basis for personal relationships and trust (Whitten et al., 2007).  Fairness 
operates at both a universal and a situational, context-specific level (Syme et al., 
1999).  Identifying a fair solution therefore requires consideration of the local context A. Reeson 
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as well as generally held ethical concerns; the way in which this is done is also 
crucial for establishing procedural fairness.  As laboratory experiments show, 
interventions that are perceived as unfair elicit positive responses, while unfair 
interventions can result in negative reactions to the detriment of all concerned. 
Intrinsically motivated environmental actions may be promoted by 
demonstrating the importance of particular environmental goods and services, and 
highlighting the value of individual contributions.  This could support and strengthen 
intrinsic motivations by boosting any warm glow and self image benefits, or 
perceptions of responsibility and obligation.  Promoting self determination, for 
instance by emphasising that people have a choice of actions, rather than seeking to 
control their actions may also be beneficial. In the laboratory, persuasion has a 
strong, but short lived, impact on contributions (Reeson and Tisdell, in press).   
Education about the benefits of environmental action may have a longer term 
crowding in effect (Frey and Stutzer, 2006).  As perceived competence at an activity 
is an important aspect of intrinsic motivation, helping people learn how to carry out 
environmental actions and why they are important can promote pro-environmental 
activity, and may be more effective than one-off payments (De Young, 2000).  
Voluntary schemes, such as Land for Wildlife in Australia, rely on intrinsic 
motivations to achieve environmental objectives.  The Land for Wildlife scheme 
provides recognition, through signs to be displayed on a property, along with 
education and social opportunities, all of which are likely to have a positive effect on 
intrinsic motivations.  This type of scheme provides participants with a sense of being 
part of a broader community activity, working towards a common goal, which has 
been identified as a source of intrinsic satisfaction (De Young, 1996; Measham and 
Barnett, 2007). Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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The way in which a situation is perceived can determine the extent to which 
intrinsic motivations are applied.  Therefore the way a policy is framed and 
communicated may have a significant impact.  In laboratory prisoners’ dilemma 
games, people are more likely to cooperate if the game is explained in ‘cooperative’ 
rather than ‘competitive’ terms (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).  Many environmental 
schemes are labelled as ‘partnerships’ or ‘assistance’ programs, which may help to 
minimise crowding out.  Particular care should be taken with market-based incentive 
schemes, as the competitive nature of markets can trigger people to behave in a self-
interested rather than cooperative manner (Bowles, 1998; Sobel, 2005; Reeson and 
Tisdell, 2007).  Financial incentives may crowd in intrinsic motivations if they 
recognise competence, and are perceived as supporting rather than controlling (Frey, 
2001).  They can also acknowledge the importance of an activity, sending a signal 
that it is valued by society (Thogersen, 2003). 
Monitoring and sanctioning are often seen as essential to promote ethical 
behaviour.  However, the examples discussed above show that it can have an 
adverse effect on trust and intrinsic motivation, so in some cases it may negatively 
impact on environmental activity.  In the right circumstances, intrinsically motivated 
social norms for cooperation can be self reinforcing and grow stronger through time, 
whereas cooperation enforced by external rules can disappear very quickly (Ostrom, 
2000).  Environmental behaviour is frequently difficult to monitor and enforce, so it is 
likely that regulations will inhibit the formation or maintenance of social norms while 
providing little extrinsic motivation for cooperation (Frey and Stutzer, 2006).   
Therefore, promoting pro-environmental social norms is an effective way of 
motivating environmental behaviour.  This has been effectively applied in Australia to 
encourage reductions in household water consumption.  Indeed it has been shown A. Reeson 
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that such norms are the best predictor of intentions to conserve (Kantola et al., 
1982).  The downside of promoting intrinsically motivated social norms is that conflict 
can result if someone is perceived to be violating the norm – ‘water rage’ has 
apparently resulted in vandalism, violence and even murder in suburban Australia. 
In some circumstances, formal institutions can promote trust.  Individuals who 
are less trusting contribute less in public good games (Yamagishi, 1988), presumably 
because they do not expect others to reciprocate.  However the introduction of an 
institution to monitor and sanction contributions results in them making higher 
contributions – these individuals now have greater trust that others will contribute 
(Ostrom, 1998).  Similarly, the conditional cooperation seen in laboratory public 
goods games can be rapidly eroded by a small number of free riders, but maintained 
if there is a sanctioning mechanism available (Ostrom, 2000).  If levels of trust are 
low, strong institutions may be more advantageous than in situations where people 
are more trusting.  Frey (2001) argues that the motivational effects of trust and 
reciprocity may be highest at low and high levels of sanctioning.  As sanctions and 
enforcement increase, trust will be crowded out.  However there is also evidence that 
people are more willing to act cooperatively if they expect others to do the same.  
Therefore intermediate levels of trust are likely to be sufficient to crowd out intrinsic 
trustworthiness, but insufficient to create institutional trust, that is a belief that others 
will cooperate. 
Trust is most effective where there are one-on-one interactions or personal 
relationships.  The more personal the relationship, the greater the importance of 
intrinsic motivations, and the greater the potential crowding out from extrinsic 
incentives (Frey, 1997).  Other situations, particularly with large, impersonal groups, 
are likely to require more formal institutions.  A small number of simple rules, Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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including sanctioning mechanisms perceived as fair and proportional, but which still 
provide individuals with a sense of choice in their actions, provide the best 
opportunity for maintaining intrinsic motivations (Frey and Stutzer, 2006). 
Matching the Institution to the Motivation 
Intrinsic motivations can appear nebulous and therefore difficult to manage, so there 
is a tendency for economists and policy makers to concentrate on extrinsic incentives 
(Frey, 2001).  However, promoting intrinsic motivations can provide a cost effective 
means of achieving environmental outcomes, and may also have a positive effect on 
social capital.  In many cases it will still be necessary to impose extrinsic incentives 
or regulations in order to reach the desired environmental target.  How might such 
institutions be designed, in order to maintain existing voluntary activity while also 
providing robust extrinsic incentives?  There is a danger that introducing payments, 
particularly competitive market-based payments, for the provision of ecosystem 
services means that landholders will come to expect to be paid for actions they are 
currently doing voluntarily.  One solution may be to encourage people to define their 
own ‘baseline’ for providing ecosystem services, reflecting their current efforts.  For 
those landholders who are not intrinsically motivated, this may be their minimum 
legal duty of care.  For others, they may specify a higher baseline, beyond which they 
are still able to seek incentive payments.  This could be acknowledged by providing 
some sort of official recognition, thus supporting existing intrinsic motivations while 
also providing extrinsic incentives for further action.  
If few people are intrinsically motivated then there is little downside to 
implementing extrinsic incentives.  Where there are a range of existing motivations, 
then matching the incentive to the motivation can become more complex.  A concept 
from psychology which may be useful here is the hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1970).  A. Reeson 
21 
The most basic needs are biological – air, food, shelter, followed by the need for 
security, social belonging and self esteem.  Behaviour is motivated by the most basic 
unsatisfied need.  For instance, if a person has insufficient food, their behaviour will 
primarily be motivated by the need to eat.  Security, social acceptance and self 
esteem will be relatively unimportant.  If a person has their basic biological 
requirements met but feels unsafe, they will be mostly concerned about security.  If 
an individual can meet these basic needs (it is believed few do) they can go on to 
‘self actualisation’, where they are free to grow and develop according to their own 
goals, rather than simply responding to basic needs.  If a person’s basic biological or 
security needs are lacking they are less likely to be motivated by social preferences 
or warm-glow altruism.  
The higher up the hierarchy of needs a person is, the more likely they are to 
be intrinsically motivated based on personal values.  An understanding of existing 
needs and motivations of stakeholders may be useful in designing incentives.  For 
instance, if a person is motivated by a need for security because they are in danger 
of bankruptcy, appealing to social motivations is unlikely to be enough.  This may be 
particularly relevant for farmers on marginal land, where the need for pro-
environmental actions is often greatest, but financial resources are most limited.   
People who are financially more secure and already carrying out some voluntary 
activities are more likely to respond to social and self esteem incentives, and may be 
adversely affected by formal institutions which fail to account for these motivations.  It 
is likely that policy selection can be considerably aided by consideration of existing 
motivations and norms, and how they may interact with proposed new institutions.  It 
is also necessary to consider the effects of policy interventions on future governance.  
Policy design is path dependent, as once perceptions and motivations are changed it Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Environmental Policy 
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is not necessarily straightforward to change them back.  Future problems can be 
minimised by considering the full range of existing motivations and institutions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Intrinsic motivations are likely to be particularly important in environmental decision-
making.  Many people consider that the environment has inherent value, and there 
are also strong social motivations and feelings of obligation for environmental 
actions.  Many people are already voluntarily contributing to a greater or lesser 
degree towards the provision of environmental goods and services.  However it is 
clear that for many issues these voluntary contributions are insufficient and therefore 
there is a role for policy to promote additional actions.  The theoretical and empirical 
evidence presented in this paper shows that institutions can change people’s 
motivations and decision making processes in ways not predicted by the rational 
actor paradigm.  There is therefore a danger that introducing new policies may crowd 
out existing intrinsic motivations, or alter the way in which a decision is framed, 
potentially resulting in an adverse outcome. 
Where new policies or institutions are required, it is useful to consider existing 
motivations to avoid or minimise the negative effects of crowding out.  In situations 
where there is little intrinsic motivation, and people are already making decisions 
from a self interest perspective, extrinsic incentives are most likely to have their 
expected positive effects.  However if people are initially intrinsically motivated and 
are considering a decision within a social, ethical or environmental frame, then policy 
interventions can have potential negative consequences.  This does not mean that 
such interventions should not be attempted – if the extrinsic incentives are sufficiently 
strong they may compensate for any crowding out effects.  However a better 
designed policy may be able to crowd in, rather than crowd out, existing motivations.  A. Reeson 
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A more thorough understanding of the interactions between different motivations, and 
the way in which people make decisions, would greatly facilitate the design and 
assessment of policies and institutions. 
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Figure 1.  Supply curve for a good or service for which the supplier is intrinsically 
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